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The Model-Model of the Theory-Theory 
Why ‘theory of mind’ seems ubiquitous, even though it isn’t 
 
 
Marc Slors 
 
Abstract 
“Theory of mind” (ToM) is widely held to be ubiquitous in our navigation of the 
social world. Recently this standard view has been contested by phenomenologists 
and enactivists. Proponents of the ubiquity of ToM, however, accept and 
effectively neutralize the intuitions behind their arguments by arguing that ToM is 
mostly subpersonal. This paper proposes a similar move on behalf of the 
phenomenologists and enactivists: it offers an explanation of the intuition that 
ToM is ubiquitous that is compatible with the rejection of this ubiquity. 
According to this explanation, we use ToM-talk mostly to model or reconstruct 
nonmentalizing social-cognitive processes for practical and theoretical purposes. 
The intuition that ToM is ubiquitous is the result of mistaking the model for the 
real thing.  
 
 
“Efficient practice precedes the theory of it.” 
[Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinton House, 1949, p. 30] 
  
“Theory of Mind”, or “ToM” for short, is “the cognitive achievement that 
enables us to report our propositional attitudes, to attribute such attitudes 
to others, and to use such postulated or observed mental states in the 
prediction and explanation of behavior.”1 (Garfield et. al. 2001: 494) In 
philosophy, psychology, linguistics and neuroscience, the majority view has 
it that ToM is ubiquitous in our navigation of the social world. Since about 
a decade, however, this standard view is no longer universally accepted. A 
growing number of philosophers, mainly of a phenomenological or 
enactivist bent, contend that our primary and most pervasive way of making 
sense of each other in daily social interaction is not ToM-driven (Gallagher 
2001, 2004; Hobson 2002; Hutto 2004, 2008a, 2008b; Ratcliffe 2007; 
Hutto and Ratcliffe 2007; Gallagher and Zahavi 2008a; Zahavi 2005, 2007;                                                         
1 Throughout this paper I will remain neutral on the question what such a cognitive achievement 
looks like in detail. The usual understanding of ToM is in terms of rules or laws, but according to 
Maibom’s (2003) account ToM consists of psychological models we employ while assuming 
background hypotheses. Nothing in this papers hinges on this. 
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Bermúdez 2003; Maibom 2007). Many (though not all2) of these 
philosophers claim that ToM is used only in the relatively scarce cases where 
more basic social cognitive skills that are claimed to be pervasive do not 
suffice. ToM-adherents now start to launch counterattacks on the 
phenomenologists and enactivists (Herschbach 2008a, 2008b, Currie 2008, 
Spaulding 2010), i.e. there is an emerging debate over the ubiquity of ToM. 
The issue is whether the social cognitive mechanisms we use most frequently 
in social interaction should be understood in terms of the application of a 
ToM. Thus, the debate is between extremes. Either ToM is claimed to be 
ubiquitous, or it is downplayed as a fringe phenomenon.  
This paper starts from the observation that, given the structure of 
the debate, a stable position in it requires not only a defense of one of these 
extremes, it also requires that the intuitions in favor of the other extreme be 
explained or explained away. There is no use in trying to convince a flat-
earth believer that the world is round, unless one explains at the same time 
why it seems flat. The “ToM-ist” orthodoxy has a well entrenched solution 
to this problem: it can be conceded that from a phenomenological point of 
view it seems as if we rarely use our ToM in social navigation, when the 
operations of our ToM’s are thought to take place mainly at an unconscious, 
sub-personal level. Within the  phenomenologist and enactivist camps, by 
contrast, no explanation has been offered for the ToM-ist intuition that we 
understand most or all intentional actions of others in terms of motivating 
beliefs and desires.  
 The goal of this paper is to propose an explanation of the intuition 
that ToM is ubiquitous that fits the enactivist/phenomenologist position. 
This explanation hinges on the idea that ToM is not only used as a social 
cognitive mechanism, but also as a model for non-mentalizing social cognitive 
mechanisms. These non-mentalizing mechanisms are in fact ubiquitous, as 
enactivists and phenomenologists claim. The intuition that ToM is 
ubiquitous, according to this explanation, is the result of mistaking the 
model in terms of which we understand the ubiquitous way we understand 
others for the real thing.  
The paper is set up as follows. In Section 1 I will outline the reasons 
for contesting the ubiquity of ToM and indicate how ToM-ists accommodate 
these reasons by conceiving of ToM mainly as a sub-personal affair. I will 
discuss serious problems with this move and briefly sketch the enactivist 
proposal to do without sub-personal ToM. I will argue that even though 
these considerations do not count as a decisive rejection of the ubiquity of                                                         
2 Ratcliffe, for instance, appears to reject ToM entirely as a philosophers myth. Hutto, on the other 
hand, rejects only the theoretical nature of the capacities required for daily interaction. But his 
substitute for ToM, the practice of providing “folk-psychological narratives”, is not at all claimed to be 
a rare social phenomenon.  
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(sub-personal) ToM, they certainly warrant an investigation into the 
feasibility of a phenomenological/enactivist position that rejects the 
ubiquity of ToM. A remaining serious obstacle for such a position is the lack 
of an explanation for the apparently widespread intuition that ToM is 
ubiquitous. In Section 2 I will sketch the “model-model” of ToM as a means 
of accommodating the intuition that ToM is ubiquitous without 
contradicting the enactivist/phenomenologist rejection of ToM. In Section 
3, I will defend the model-model of ToM by showing that, contrary to first 
appearances, it offers the best interpretation of theorizing about ToM 
acquisition in developmental psychology.  
 
 
1. The Contested Ubiquity of Theory of Mind 
 
According to a majority view in social cognition research, “(…) our basic grip 
on the social world depends on our being able to see our fellows as 
motivated by beliefs and desires we sometimes share and sometimes do not.” 
(Currie and Sterelny 2000: 145) This view is so dominant and intuitive—at 
least to those steeped in the mainstream literature of social cognitive 
neuroscience, linguistics and analytical philosophy—that it may look as if 
there is no alternative. In the words of Baron-Cohen, “(…) it is hard for us to 
make sense of behavior in any other way than via the mentalistic (or 
‘intentional’) framework (…). [A]ttribution of mental states is to humans as 
echolocation is to the bat.  It is our natural way of understanding the social 
environment.” (Baron-Cohen 1995: 3-4) 
 But it is precisely this “naturalness” of ToM that is currently being 
questioned. One important complaint is that a ToM-based conception of 
social cognition assumes an unnatural observer model of social interaction. 
ToM-based accounts of social interaction hinge on the idea that 
understanding and predicting the behavior of others is key (an idea that was 
attacked earlier; see Morton 1996). And the picture of what such 
understanding and prediction amounts to is very much that of a detached 
observer adopting a third-person perspective on the interpreted other. Either 
we are thought to infer the beliefs and desires of the other person from 
observed behavior by applying our theory of mind. Or we are thought to 
ascribe the outcomes of our own decision making procedures to the 
observed other after we put ourselves in their mental shoes. In real life, 
however, most of the time we do not observe and predict each other, we 
interact with each other adopting an engaged, second-person perspective. In 
Hutto’s words, “Understanding others is not essentially a spectator sport” 
(Hutto 2008b: 12). 
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 With this emphasis on the dominance of the second-person, I-you, 
perspective in social interaction, it becomes much less natural to consider 
the attribution of beliefs, desires, intentions, hopes and fears etc. to play the 
central role they are usually assigned. Compare the way in which we 
understand our own actions (cf. Gallagher 2001: 88). I understand my own 
actions at a pragmatic intentional level as being goal-directed. This does not 
usually involve my consciously ascribing beliefs and desires to myself. When 
I am thirsty and reach for a glass of water, I am aware of the purpose of that 
action. But such awareness does not usually involve explicitly ascribing the 
desire for water to myself, or the belief that water quenches thirst. The same 
is true, according to phenomenologists, of understanding the actions of 
others in second-person interaction: we understand their actions in their 
contexts in terms of purposefulness and goal-directedness, without ascribing 
more abstract and generalizable propositional attitudes.  
 Instead of attributing beliefs and desires, Gallagher, Hutto and many 
others claim, we are directly responsive to intentionality, purpose and goal-
directedness in the contextualized actions of others, just as we directly see 
emotions in facial expressions and gestures (see also Hobson 2002, 
Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, Hutto and Ratcliffe 2007, Morton 2003). When 
someone walks up to me at a coktail party, purposefully, with an outstreched 
hand, I immediately ‘see’ her intention to shake hands. I need not make any 
inference about the mindset of this person for that (see also, Hutto 2008a: 
6). Similarly, we directly perceive emotions in the facial expressions of 
others. To use one of Gallagher’s favoratie quotes: 
 
(…) [W]e certainly believe ourselves to be directly acquainted with another person’s 
joy in his laughter, with his sorrow and pain in his tears, with his shame in his 
blushing, with his entreaty in his outstreched hands, with his love in his look of 
affection, with his rage in the gnashing of his teeth with his threats in the 
clenching of his fist, and with the tenor of his thoughts in the sound of his words. 
If anyone tells me this is not ‘perception’, for it cannot be so, in view of the fact 
that a perception is simply ‘a complex of physical sensations’ and that there 
certainly is no sensation of another person’s mind (…) I would beg him to turn 
aside from such questionable theories and address himself to the 
phenomenological facts. (Scheler 1954: 260; see also Wittgenstein 1980: § 570) 
 
How do we know that the blushing we see in someone’s face is indeed an 
expression of shame and not of, say, excitement or physical exercise? Here 
phenomenologists and enactivists typically invoke the crucial role of 
contextual setting and co-occurrence of various actions, gestures and facial 
expressions. Blushing combined with avoidance of the gaze of a person who 
has just made a critical remark about the blusher, for instance, is not easily 
mistaken as a sign of excitement or physical exercise.  
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 There are three important elements in the 
phenomenological/enactivist rejection of the ubiquity of ToM. 1. First of 
all, the claim is that for most day to day interpresonal interactions we need 
not and do not ascribe propositional attitudes—full-blown beliefs and desires 
with a specifiable propositional content—to others. It is sufficient to ascribe 
purposefulness, goal directedness and intentionally on a pragmatic level. In 
Hutto’s terminology, it is sufficient to ascribe intentional attitudes (to be 
distinguished from propositional attitudes; see Hutto 2008a ch. 3). To the 
extent that such intentional attitudes are mental, this means that we do 
understand others as minded beings. 2. However, this does not mean that it 
is granted that we ubiquitously interpret the behaviour of others in terms of 
a hidden mental realm. The claim is that in most day to day interactions, the 
basic intentional states of others are not hidden behind the actions, gestures 
and expressions for which they are merely causally responsible. Rather, they 
are present in these actions, gestures and expressions, and we perceive them 
as such. 3. This means that ascription of intentional attitudes proceeds 
noninferentiality. It is not the case that we postulate unobservable states 
behind the behaviour of others. Nor is it the case that we infer a specific 
interpretation of someone’s actions, gestures or expressions by using 
contextual cues. Rather, the claim is that we directly perceive meaning in 
contextualized (combinations of) actions, gestures and expressions.   
 For these reasons and in this sense, our daily navigation of the social 
world is claimed not to require our ubiquitously wielding a theory of mind. 
Intentional attitudes are not the (folk-psychological) kinds of mental state 
that figure in ToM. Moreover, since they are noninferentially observable, no 
theory is required to postulate them. This obviously constitutes a rejection 
of the so-called ‘theory theory’ (TT) of social cognition as an account of most 
day to day personal interactions. But it also implies a rejection of a 
dominant version of the so-called simulation theory (ST) according to which 
we understand others not by wielding a theory but by putting ourselves in 
the other’s mental shoes—as it is often put. For most versions of ST agree 
that navigation of the social world involves (1) ubiquitously ascribing 
propositional attitudes to others, where such attitudes are taken to be (2) 
nonobservable states that are at best causally responsible for observable 
behaviour of others (Goldman 2006, Nichols et. al. 1996). (3) In many cases 
ST can also be said to involve inference when it comes to the final ascription 
of propositional attitudes after the simulation procedure or when it comes 
to initiation such procedures through the generation of ‘pretend beliefs and 
desires’ (see also Perner 1996). Having said this, though, I should also stress 
that an important version of ST does not meet these criteria (Gordon 1986, 
1996). This version is often explicitly not targeted by the 
The Model-Model of the Theory-Theory  2.9.15  
 6 
phenomenologist/enactivist critics (Hutto 2008a: 138-139) and  takes itself 
to be congenial to the phenomenologist/enactivist position (Gordon 2008).  
 Despite their rejection of the ubiquity of ToM, phenomenologists 
and enactivists do concede that ToM abilities are, every now and then, 
necessary when social perception fails. But such occasions are exceptional, 
according to Gallagher (2008: 165): “(…) mentalizing or mindreading are, at 
best, specialized abilities that are relatively rarely employed, and they depend 
on more embodied and situated ways of perceiving and understanding 
others, which are more primary and pervasive.” Hutto (2008a) argues that 
instead of mentalizing in a ToM-ist fashion we employ “folk-psychological 
narratives” to supplement what he calls “unprincipled bodily engagements.” 
Ratcliffe is more radical in thinking that folk-psychology, even if it is 
understood in non ToM-ist fashion such as proposed by Hutto, is a 
philosophers construct: “(…) what is labeled an “everyday”, “commonsense” 
or “folk” psychology and routinely accepted as the core of human social life 
is actually nothing of the sort and bears little relation to how people 
understand each other.” (Ratcliffe 2007: 2) At any rate, according to these 
critics ToM is not, as Baron-Cohen would have it, “our natural way of 
understanding the social environment.” At best it is an exceptional 
phenomenon in social interaction.  
The response of proponents of the ubiquity of ToM to these 
considerations is simple and appears, at least initially, effective. Proponents 
of the ubiquity of ToM do not dispute phenomenological claims about the 
apparent absence of ToM in most social interactions. Instead, they argue 
that these claims leave completely open the option that ToM is ubiquitous 
at the sub-personal level. Thus, referring to ToM in terms of its two main 
guises, the theory theory and the simulation theory, Herschbach writes:  
 
I agree that [Gallagher and Zahavi’s] phenomenological claims have bite at the 
personal level, distinguishing direct perception from conscious theorizing and 
simulation. Their appeals to phenomenology and other arguments do not, 
however, rule out theory theory and simulation theory as accounts of the 
subpersonal processes underlying social perception. (Herschbach 2008b: 223)  
 
In a similar vain, Spaulding writes:  
 
With mindreading, there is a process (theorizing or simulating), and there is a 
product (an explanation or a prediction). In general, neither the process nor the 
product need be consciously accessible, let alone phenomenologically transparent. 
If only the product of mindreading (the explanation or prediction of behavior) is 
available at the conscious level, then presumably this would feel 
phenomenologically as if our interactions are the result of immediate, non-
mentalistic understanding. (Spaulding 2010: 131)  
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This move is all but ad hoc. The idea that ToM is mainly a sub-personal 
affair is a majority view with a respectable tradition independent of the 
present discussion. Especially in the theory-theory camp few philosophers 
claim that we mainly theorize consciously about the mental states of others. 
In the simulation theory camp there are versions that reject conscious 
simulation (e.g. Gordon 1995, 1996) while the ones that do allow for 
conscious simulation leave ample room for sub-personal simulation (cf. 
Goldman 2006, ch. 6). 
Even though the move is not ad hoc, it does not go down well with 
the enemy. Gallagher and Zahavi, notably, object to the notion of sub-
personal ToM. Their misgivings initially coincided partly with what 
Blackburn (1992) called “the promiscuity objection”: characterizing sub-
personal processes as theoretical would stretch the meaning of the term 
“theory” beyond its normal use (cf. Zahavi 2005: 181). According to 
Gallagher (2005: 215), the term ‘theory’ and it’s associated notion of 
‘explanation’ are normally taken to imply reflective consciousness. If so, it is 
not clear what is being said when sub-personal, unconscious, processes are 
considered to be theoretical. But when pressured, their hostility to sub-
personal theorizing turns out to be of a kind with their rejection of personal 
level theorizing. The fact is that attempts have been made to meet the 
promiscuity objection. Herschbach (2008b: 227-8) points this out, citing 
Gopnik and Melzoff (1997) as an example, who define “theory” in terms of 
structural, functional and dynamic features, leaving consciousness or 
reflection out of their definition. In a joint paper, Gallagher and Zahavi 
answer that they do and did recognize the existence of definitions of 
“theory” that avoid promiscuity. They mention explanatory and predictive 
power, counterfactual projection, the introduction of unobservable entities, 
and the integration of information within a small number of general 
principles as proposed defining features. They then point out that it is in 
particular the postulation of unobservable entities that makes theorizing 
unfit to characterize social cognition (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008: 238), both 
at the personal and the sub-personal level.  
 Gallagher and Zahavi’s objection to the idea of sub-personal ToM, 
then, only bears on one aspect of it. The point is that even if one theory-
defining element—the postulation of unobservable entities—is left out, it still 
seems perfectly intelligible to speak of sub-personal processes as instantiating 
a theory. Features such as counterfactual projection and integration of 
information within a relatively small number of principles might well suffice 
to think of ToM in sub-personal terms without rendering the term “theory” 
vacuous. All in all, then, Herschbach and Spaulding’s idea to “go sub-
personal” in order to defend the ubiquity of ToM against phenomenologist 
considerations appears intelligible and sensible. This move allows them to 
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explain why they think ToM can be ubiquitous despite appearances to the 
contrary. The strength of “going sub-personal” is precisely in the fact that 
the phenomenological view of social interaction is respected—and 
neutralized. 
 But this does not mean that the going subpersonal move suffices to 
save the ubiquity of ToM. For one principal argument against the ubiquity 
of ToM stems not from phenomenological considerations, but from 
considerations about computational parsimony that apply just as much to 
the sub-personal level. As Bermúdez notes:  
 
(…) the application of [ToM] principles requires identifying, among a range of 
possible principles that might apply, the ones that are the most salient in a given 
situation. It requires identifying whether the appropriate background conditions 
hold, or whether there are countervailing factors in play. It requires thinking 
through the implications of the principles one does choose to apply in order to 
extrapolate their explanatory/predictive consequences. (…) [This] certainly makes 
them rather unwieldy. (Bermúdez 2003: 31-2) 
 
Many social interactions are simply not complex enough to warrant the use 
of such an unwieldy cognitive mechanism. From the viewpoint of 
computational parsimony, then, this observation counts as a serious 
disadvantage of the view that ToM is ubiquitous.  
Spaulding interprets the charge in the context of the contrast 
between the phenomenology of social interaction and the sub-personal 
processes that are at play in this and responds by noting (Spaulding 2010: 
135-6): “Of course what happens at the sub-personal level is going to be 
computationally more complex than how it seems to us at the personal level, 
but that is no strike against theories about sub-personal processes. (…) The 
contrast of the computational complexity of mindreading with the 
phenomenal ease and instantaneousness of social interaction is not, in and 
of itself, evidence that mindreading cannot be our normal way of 
understanding others.” One thing to note about this reply is that, as a 
counter-argument, this puts an impossible and unreasonable burden of 
proof put on the anti-ToM-ist. In the absence of reasons to rule out in 
principle a ToM-ist reading of sub-personal processes, Spaulding will not be 
convinced. But that is to treat ToM-ism as the default position without 
argument. More importantly, neither Bermúdez nor anyone else will deny 
that the sub-personal processes underlying simple social interaction are 
complex. The issue is not just about complexity, it is about unnecessary 
complexity. Bermúdez’ point is that conceiving of neural processes 
underlying simple interactions in ToM terms makes them much more 
complex than they need to be.  
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Here it is crucial to consider the competition. According to the anti-
ToM camp, daily social interaction is not facilitated by the attribution of 
propositional attitudes, but rather by the perception of basic intentional 
attitudes, goal directedness, emotions etc. The neural mechanisms at play in 
such social perception are for a large part uncharted territory. But this does 
not mean that nothing can be said about them. Gallagher and Zahavi 
(2008a: 178-179) think social perception can be modelled on enactive 
theories of perception as sensory-motor processes (cf. e.g. Noë 2004; see 
Gallagher 2009 for an elaborate defense of this view). Typically, mirror 
neuron activity and phenomena of ‘empathic resonance’ (di Pellegrino et. al. 
1992, Gallese 2001) are viewed as important contributors to such processes 
of enactive social perception (see also Hutto, forthcoming). This means that 
a simulationist interpretation of them is (largely, but not entirely—see Slors 
2010) resisted. The point here is that such neural mechanisms, although no 
doubt very complex, avoid the extra complexity that Bermúdez observes to be 
involved in ToM mechanisms. Thus, Spaulding’s argument against 
Bermúdez fails, and considerations about computational parsimony do seem 
to count against the idea that ToM is ubiquitous. 
 A close kin of the problem of computational complexity is the frame 
problem. It is sometimes claimed (e.g. Heal 1996) that conceiving of our 
access to the minds of others in theoretical terms runs into the following 
difficulty: there is no a priori limit on the information that possibly bears on 
the ascription of mental states to others from a purely theoretical, non-
empathic point of view. Spaulding claims that enactivists and 
phenomenologists run into the same problem since they “must explain how 
it is that we can determine which facial gestures, eye movements, expressive 
movements, etc. are relevant to understanding other people (…). There is no 
a priori limit on what embodied cues are relevant to understanding others.” 
(Spaulding 2010: 136-7)  
This charge misses its goal, however. The point is that from an 
enactivist point of view we don’t need a priori limits on cues relevant to 
understanding others, as long as the sensori-motor processes underlying 
social interaction are wired so as to respond to the relevant ones. If they do, 
they “embody knowledge” about the relevance of behavioral cues. But since 
they do not represent that knowledge as such,  talk of a priori limits on cues is 
beside the point. Wondering how sensori-motor systems manage to “select” 
the relevant information, “discarding irrelevant information”, is like 
wondering why it is that the moon has exactly the right mass and speed not 
to either crash into the Earth or fly away into space. Much is presently 
unknown about the details of these sensori-motor processes, that is certainly 
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true. But there is no frame problem (see Dreyfus 2006 for further arguments 
to this effect).  
 Hence, considerations of computational complexity and the frame 
problem count strongly against the idea that ToM is ubiquitous, even if 
ToM is mainly or exclusively conceived at the sub-personal level. Although 
such considerations are admittedly not conclusive, they do warrant a further 
investigation into the feasibility of the phenomenologist/enactivist view of 
day to day social interaction without ToM. One major obstacle for this 
view—the one I shall be concerned with in the remainder of this paper—is 
the fact that so far enactivists and phenomenologists have done nothing to 
explain and/or explain away the immensely widespread intuition that ToM 
is ubiquitous in daily social interaction.3 Where ToM-ists are able to take 
into account the fact that phenomenologically speaking ToM seems not 
ubiquitous (by going sub-personal), anti-ToM-ists have no parallel argument 
to allow for the fact that an overwhelming majority of philosophers and 
psychologists consider ToM ubiquitous. My aim in the following two 
sections is to provide such an argument.  
 
 
2. ToM as a Model versus ToM as a Mechanism 
 
The aim of this section is to explain why ToM is widely taken to be 
ubiquitous, assuming that enactivists and phenomenologists are right in 
claiming this is not, in fact, the case. A good way to introduce the idea is to 
draw a partial parallel with Daniel Dennett’s intentional stance theory 
(Dennett 1987). According to Dennett the reality of beliefs and desires is 
exhausted by the fact that our behavioral patterns can easily and usefully be 
tracked through adopting the intentional stance. Adopting the intentional 
stance towards a system is understanding that system’s behavior as being 
issued by beliefs and desires. Some have described this as an “as-if” theory of 
mental state ascription (McCulloch 1990). But on the intentional stance 
theory beliefs and desires are more than just fictions. They are useful fictions 
that track real behavioral patterns that cannot in any other way be tracked 
(Dennett 1991a). Still, beliefs and desires do not exist as psycho-neural 
realities, according to the intentional stance theory. There really are no 
semantically evaluable internal causes of actions that accord with our belief-
desire psychology (cf. Fodor 1985: 78) in the observed agents (see however, 
Slors 2007). On Dennett’s account that would be a “gratuitous bit of 
misplaced concreteness” (Dennett 1987: 55).                                                         
3 Hutto (2009a, 2009b) is in some respects an exception. A comparison of Hutto”s explanation of the 
ToM intuition and the one provided in the next section, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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 The intentional stance theory is presented as a more or less ToM-ist 
position.4 According to it we navigate the social world mainly through 
attributing beliefs and desires. As such the position is of no use to the 
project of explaining the intuition that ToM is ubiquitous against the 
background assumption that ToM is not ubiquitous. My proposal, however, 
is to take the intentional stance idea one level up: the cognitive mechanisms 
involved in understanding others and navigating the social world can best be 
tracked and understood for practical purposes in terms of the attribution of 
beliefs and desires, i.e. the application of a ToM. But that is not to say that 
these cognitive mechanisms use or implement a ToM. ToM is a model of 
ubiquitous social cognitive mechanisms that would otherwise be intractable. 
Since the model provides our ways of thinking and talking about such 
mechanisms, it may easily be mistaken for the real thing. This explains the 
intuition that ToM is ubiquitous. Let me go over this proposal in a little 
more detail. 
We sometimes explain or excuse our actions towards other by stating 
what it is we, perhaps mistakenly, thought the other was thinking or what 
she or he wanted or hoped or feared, etc. In the context of a common 
history and certain shared norms of conduct, the following kind of 
explanation or excuse is common: “I’m sorry, I thought you wanted x 
because you said y and so I figured you would probably wanted me to…….”. 
In this type of explanation we model our own grasp of someone else’s 
conduct as theorizing in terms of attributed beliefs, desires and other 
propositional attitudes. Applying Dennett’s move to his own theory: we talk 
about ourselves as if we adopted the intentional stance. But the reality of 
this stance, the reality of our application of a ToM, is often similar to how 
Dennett envisages the reality of beliefs and desires. Beliefs and desires, in his 
theory, are not psycho-neural realities in the heads of the people whose 
behavior we predict and explain in their terms. Likewise, according to the 
proposed position our adopting the intentional stance, our wielding a ToM 
is—very often (see below for the exceptions)—not a psycho-neural reality. In 
that sense, it is very often a fiction. But it is a useful fiction that models real 
social-cognitive mechanisms that are otherwise intractable. Thus it is 
incorrect to say that ToM is entirely a philosopher’s myth (cf. Ratcliffe 
2007).  
The claim that our wielding a ToM is often not a psycho-neural 
reality might need some further elaboration. In this context it is useful to                                                         
4 The intentional stance theory is ToM-ist in the sense that Dennett writes as if he considers the 
ascription of beliefs and desires ubiquitous. But although he sometimes seems to defend a theoretical 
reading of what it is to adopt the intentional stance (e.g. 1987, chapter 4), at other occasions he rejects 
such a reading (e.g. Dennett 1991b). 
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distinguish between different levels at which a cognitive system—in this case 
a social cognitive system—can be described. One can describe the social 
cognitive mechanisms at play in our daily interaction at the neural level, at 
the functional level and at the phenomenological level. The claim defended 
here is that wielding a ToM does not describe what is going on in the social 
cognitive processes that underlie most daily interpersonal interaction at the 
phenomenological level, nor does it describe these processes at the neural 
level. This is in line with the phenomenologist/enactivist position discussed 
in the previous section. At the functional level of description, however, 
wielding a ToM may be said to capture these processes. But only if a 
functional description is not taken to involve identifying a network of 
interrelated states definable in terms of their causal roles. For that would 
imply that the occupiers of these roles, which are neural states, may be 
described as implementing a ToM mechanism. If, however, a functional 
description is taken to refer to a description that captures, to some degree of 
accuracy, what a system does in repsonse to the inputs it receives, that is, if a 
functional description is an interpretive description of a system taken as a 
whole, it seems reasonable to say that our daily social cognitive mechanisms 
can be functionally described as wielding a ToM. This boils down to saying 
that we can model the neural mechanisms and the phenomenal experiences 
at play in daily social interaction in terms of our wielding a ToM. 
Thus, I claim that when we give explanations or excuses such as “I 
thought you wanted me to …..”, this is not usually intended as a 
phenomenologically accurate recounting of mental episodes. There is 
usually not a moment at which one literally thinks to oneself “x wants me to 
do y.” Likewise, there is not, usually, a conscious inference preceding such a 
thought. But even when the pick-up of intentions, emotions and wishes 
from facial expressions, gestures, voice intonations and, obviously, the 
contents of another person’s speech proceeds in a few split seconds, we are 
often able to give a relatively detailed reconstruction of this pick-up in ToM-
like terms when we feel we need to provide one. Here’s an example: You 
arrive at a party, famished. The first thing you see is a table stacked with 
food. The way you look at the table probably betrays the state of your 
stomach. The host looks at you, he smiles, raises his eyebrows and gives a 
brief nod towards the table while retaining eye contact. He means to signal 
“looks good, eh.” So when you reach for a sandwich, he says, sharply: “wait, 
not everyone’s here yet.” Then you apologize: “I’m sorry. I thought saw that 
you could see I was hungry and that you meant I could have one.” You did 
not literally think that. Your response to the nod was in all likelyhood too 
quick to allow for a conscious inference from perceiving your host’s nod to 
the ascription of a belief about the state of your stomach which, in 
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conjunction with his having pity on you, may have caused his nod. 
Nevertheless, that thought does capture your unreflective assessment of the 
situation. Here it could typically be argued that such reconstructions are sub-
personal ToM routines made explicit. But ‘sub-personal’ can either mean 
‘neural’ or ‘functional’ here. On the phenomenologist/enactivist position 
explored here, your pick-up of your host’s intention may well be a matter of 
being responsive to his intentional attitudes, in which case the ‘neural’ 
interpretation of ‘sub-personal’ would be wrong-headed (see previous 
section). If, on the other hand, ‘sub-personal’ is interpreted as ‘functional’, 
making sub-personal ToM routines explicit boils down to affirming the 
model-model of ToM. In that case, the reconstruction is what Dennett calls 
a “heuristic overlay”. That is, it may well be that the ToM explanation does 
not mirror an in principle specifiable, tractable sub-personal process, but 
instead employs a psychological vocabulary that serves the purpose of 
interpersonal sense-making rather than intrapersonal description.  
A couple of things are worth noticing at this point. First, this 
interpersonal sense-making may take the form of providing explanations or 
excuses such as the above mentioned. But it may also serve other functions, 
such as explaining to a third party why one thinks x did such and such or 
decided so and so, for instance in a dispute over someone’s motivations. 
Secondly, it is important to note that the fact that we can model social 
cognitive processes in ToM terms does not imply that we do this very often. 
Finally, the social cognitive processes that are reconstructed in ToM terms 
may be diverse. In the phenomenological literature (and in the remainder of 
this paper), there is an emphasis on the direct pick-up of intentions and 
emotions. But understanding others based on character traits, moods, social 
roles (Ratcliffe 2007, Goldie 2007, Morton 2003) or narratives (Hutto 
2008a) is also often described in non-mentalizing terms. Many instances of 
these ways to understand others can be modeled in ToM-like ways too. 
Thus, the proposal is that we often use ToM to reconstruct or 
interpret our non ToM-driven social cognitive mechanisms being either 
implemented at the neural level or present at the phenomenological level. It 
may be instructive to compare this proposal with the idea that we 
understand our own mental states not via introspection but by applying our 
ToMs to ourselves via what is known as ‘first-person mindreading’ 
(Carruthers 2009). According to the proposal under discussion, we interpret 
our own responses to others in ToM terms in circumstances in which we 
need to explain our direct assessment of others. This may sound like a form 
of first-person mindreading too. Indeed, I would not object to the term, nor 
would I object to expanding the idea to include all conscious self-ascriptions 
(see below). There is, however, a crucial difference between Carruther’s 
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notion of first-person mindreading and the current proposal: Carruthers 
thinks of first-person mindreading mainly in sub-personal, unconscious 
terms. Thus, he is a proponent of the idea that ToM is ubiquitous, not as a 
model of sub-personal social-cognitive mechanisms, but as a sub-personal 
cognitive mechanism itself.  
The comparison of the current proposal with Carruthers’ notion of 
first-person mindreading raises two questions: 1. To what extent is 
Carruthers’ ToM-ist notion of first-person mindreading susceptible to the 
general criticism levelled against ubiquitous ToM in the previous section? 2. 
Carruthers’ notion of first-person mindreading hinges on the idea that we 
are naturally endowed with a sub-personal mindreading module, but what 
can say about the nature and origins of the kind of first-person mindreading 
involved in the model-model of ToM? Let me briefly sketch the contours of 
the answers to both questions. 
1. I take it that first-person mindreading along ToM-ist lines is not 
immune to the general criticism of ubiquitous ToM outlined in the previous 
section. The considerations about computational complexity and the frame 
problem as reasons to favor a more parsimonious enactivist view on the 
neural mechanisms underlying the bulk of our daily social interactions may 
apply as well to issues of self-attribution. For here too, applying ToM means 
determining which principles are relevant, which background conditions 
hold, which countervailing factors are at play, etc. Whether the 
phenomenologist/enactivist view involves a computationally more 
parsimonious picture, depends on what it offers as an alternative for 
Carruthers’ ideas about the sub-personal mechanisms underlying self-
attribution. Gallagher (2000, 2004a, 2005) offers a 
‘neurophenomenological’ account of the sub-personal processes involved in 
self-ascription of intentions and thoughts, taking his cue from earlier 
comparator models  (cf. Wolpert et. al. 1995; Frith et. al. 2000). There is no 
space to go into the details of his proposal here. But the crucial aspect of his 
theory for the present discussion is that it avoids the extra computational 
burden of invoking theory, just like a sensory-motor theory of social 
perception avoids theory in the case of third-person attribution. Therefore, 
Bermúdez’ criticism applies to day to day first-person mindreading as well. 
2. In order to  say something about the nature and origins of our use 
of ToM as a model, it is important to note the congeniality of the model-
model and theories that view ToM primarily as a socio-linguistic 
phenomenon, summarized as follows by Astington (see also Nelson et. al. 
2003; Nelson 2005; Dunn and Brophy 2005; Hutto 2008a):  
 
Bruner (1983) proposes that parents treat infants’ spontaneous gestures as 
intentional communications and thus infants come to see themselves as having 
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intentions and start to communicate intentionally. In a similar way, parents talk to 
toddlers about their thoughts, feelings and desires, and the children come to see 
themselves as holding such states. Parents also use the same linguistic terms to talk 
about other people. That is to say, the children’s own experience is construed in 
the same terms that are applied to others, and they come to see that others have 
similar experiences to their own. Thus, linguistic development is fundamental to 
the acquisition of mental state concepts, because without language the child would 
not learn about these concepts, which are in the speech practices of culture. In this 
sense the theory of mind, perhaps even mind itself, is a cultural invention. 
(Astington 1996: 187-8) 
 
On this view, children learn learn to construe their own mental lives and 
that of others in terms of the psychological framework of the culture in 
which they are socialised. 5 This presupposes that children have an initial 
non-ToM-based grasp of the desires, intentions and emotions of themselves 
and others. For in order to be able to learn how to apply a psychological 
vocabulary, one needs to have a grasp of that to which this vocabulary is 
applied. Thus, Astington implicitly presupposes that children have some 
grasp of the mental lives of themselves and others prior to their ability to 
apply the ToM terminology. There is an extensive developmental 
psychological literature on how children acquire this initial grasp of minds. 
There is no room to discuss this literature here, but it should be stressed 
that this literature is at least compatible with (and more probably: suggestive 
of) the phenomenologist/enactivist outlook on our basic social cognitive 
abilities (see Gallagher 2004b; Gallagher 2005 ch. 9 and Hutto 2008a, ch. 
3.).  
 Hence, the view that ToM development is socially and linguistically 
scaffolded and the view that the initial basic grasp of others is non-
mentalizing complement one another. Their combination explains the sense 
in which ToM can be seen as not just as a “heuristic overlay”, but also as an 
“expository overlay”. To use a metaphor, ToM is a socio-cultural mold in 
which the wax of our non-mentalizing grasp of others acquires the shape and 
structure that allow us to put it to use in linguistically mediated social 
contexts.6 The idea of the model-model is that these ‘linguistic 
transformations’ (Hutto 2008a, ch. 4) involve not just the nonconceptually                                                         
5 It is not clear to what extent Astington applies the generality constraint here (Evans 1982), 
implying that mental predicates are understood only if they can be applied to both self and 
others. 
6 What is left out of this account is the notion that our socio-culturally shared ToM 
vocabulary also shapes and regulates the development of the mental states children ascribe 
to themselves and others as well as the kinds of social behaviour that give rise to the 
ascription of propositional attitudes. Such ‘mind-shaping’ (Zawidsky 2008) would provide 
an explanation, not so much of the ubiquity of ToM, but of ToM-interpretable social 
behaviour. The notion of mind-shaping is compatible with the model-model of ToM. 
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grasped mental states of others and ourselves, but also this initial 
nonconceptual grapsing itself. Reconstructing our initial grasp of the actions of 
others makes our understanding of others (and ourselves) tractable. And 
that serves social purposes such as explaining or excusing ones actions 
towards others (or epistemic purposes such as gaining explicit self-
knowledge).  
So, one type of use of ToM is to provide models of non-mentalizing 
social cognitive mechanisms. But once we have acquired the ability to forge 
such models, the possibility arises that it be used autonomously, in 
hypothetical mode, to predict and understand others. ToM can be used in 
abstraction from and/or as substitute for our non-mentalizing social 
cognitive abilities. The need for such use of ToM may arise when more basic 
social cognitive mechanisms are not sufficient to make a certain situation 
transparent to us. Suppose you see a car stop in front of a bank. Two armed 
and masked men rush out of the car and into the bank. The driver remains 
in the car, leaving the motor running. We don’t need to mentalize in order 
to see that there is a bank robbery going on. No implicit or explicit 
ascription of beliefs and desires is necessary. Some background knowledge 
and contextualizing of actions is sufficient. But now suppose we see the 
same scene in front of a tourist office. Now a non-mentalizing 
understanding is insufficient. The situation must be made transparent by a 
mentalizing hypothesis: these men probably think the tourist office is a 
bank.  
Obviously there are more complex situations in which we are 
required to use our ToM, not to model our social cognitive mechanisms, but 
as a social cognitive mechanism in its own right.7 Every now and then we 
need to reason about someone’s motives. The point made by 
phenomenologists, however, is that such occasions are relatively scarce. In 
day to day life our non-mentalizing social cognitive mechanisms usually do 
the bulk of the work. To repeat Gallagher: “(…) mentalizing or mindreading 
are, at best, specialized abilities that are relatively rarely employed (…).” It is 
worth noting that he goes on to say that mentalizing and mindreading—i.e. 
the use of ToM as an autonomous social cognitive tool—”depend on more 
embodied and situated ways of perceiving and understanding others, which 
are more primary and pervasive.” (Gallagher 2008: 165). This dependence, 
about which Gallagher says little, can be explained by recognizing that ToM 
development is a socio-linguistically scaffolded activity that necessarily makes 
use of pre-existing non-mentalizing social cognitive abilities.                                                         
7 I use the word “mechanism” very loosely here. The idea is that ToM may serve as an epistemic tool. 
Obviously, if used as such, on the view I expound in this section, ToM is a personal-level conscious 
affair. 
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Thus, to summarize the current proposal, there are two ways in 
which ToM is used. It can be used to model basic, non-mentalizing social 
cognitive mechanisms, which serves certain social purposes. Or it can be 
used as a social cognitive mechanism in its own right. Neither of these uses 
is ubiquitous. But the first use ensures that we naturally talk and think 
about our ubiquitous non-mentalizing grasp of others in terms of ToM. The 
intuition that ToM is ubiquitous, then, arises because the model in terms of 
which we talk and think about social cognition is quite understandably 
mistaken for the real thing.  
 
 
3. The Model-Model of ToM in Developmental Psychology 
 
On the model-model of ToM, the use of ToM that is responsible for the 
intuition that ToM is ubiquitous, is making sense of our ubiquitous but 
more basic sense-making of others. This meta-sense-making typically is a 
personal level, conscious process. At first glance, then, the model-model 
appears to be contradicted by the dominant view in developmental 
psychology.  There is a near consensus in this area about the idea that 
children as young as two or three years old are mentalizing or at least 
theorizing—very probably unconsciously or at a sub-personal level—when they 
pass what is known as nonverbal or implicit false belief tests. At first glance, 
this near-consensus appears to contradict the model-model of ToM. 
In this section, however, I will argue that the contradiction is merely 
apparent on a plausible reading of the nature of theorizing in developmental 
psychology. I will argue that the developmental psychologist’s depiction of 
early social cognitive skills of young children in terms of theorizing, 
mentalizing or both can best be viewed as the scientific variant of our 
commonsense modeling described in the previous section. On this 
interpretation the debate on infant social cognition in developmental 
psychology confirms rather than contradicts the model-model.  
 In order to appreciate the current debate on nonverbal false belief 
tests we need to start with the traditional, verbal version of the false belief 
test, instigated by Dennett’s comments (amongst others) on a 
groundbreaking paper on the ToMs of chimps (Premack and Woodruff 
1978, Dennett 1978). The test, initiated by Wimmer and Perner (1983; see 
also Baron-Cohen et. al. 1985) and replicated in endless varieties, hinges on 
the transfer of an item (a ball, a piece of chocolate, etc.) from container A to 
container B, unseen by the agent who originally put it in A. Children who 
watch the transfer scene are asked where the agent will look when she 
returns to get her item. Consistently, research shows that (at least in most 
cultures) on average children will produce the correct answer—i.e. the agent 
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will look in the box she originally put it in, since she doesn’t know it has 
been transferred and hence falsely believes it is where she put it—from the 
age of 4 onwards (Wellman et. al 2001).  
Recently, however, nonverbal tests involving similar transfer 
scenarios have been devised which suggest, according to researchers, that 
children much younger than 4 years have a rudimentary grasp of others’ 
false beliefs. Originally, Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) used a violation of 
expectation paradigm, measuring looking times of children. After the 
transfer scene, children were presented with two further scenarios, one in 
which the agent looks inside the box where she put the object, and one in 
which the agent looks inside the box where the object actually is. Children 
as young as 15 months tend to look longer at the latter scenario, which is 
interpreted as a sign of surprise. In other words, apparently they expected 
the agent to look where she falsely believes it to be. In order to avoid the 
objection that looking times are multi-interpretable, Southgate et. al. (2007) 
used eye-tracking technology and a predictive looking paradigm (I will skip 
the details for the sake of brevity since their experimental set-up is more 
sophisticated). They found that “25-month-old infants correctly anticipate 
an actor’s actions when these actions can be predicted only by attributing a 
false belief to the actor.” (Southgate et. al. 2007: 587). More nonverbal tests 
have been devised with similar results, some even claiming to find false 
belief understanding in children as young as 13 month olds (Surian et. al. 
2007). 
These results appear to be paradoxical. Children are deemed to grasp 
the fact that other people have false beliefs while they will be unable to 
express this fact for some time. Worse, their verbal utterances will at times 
contradict their looking behavior, which appears to betray a grasp of false 
beliefs. Consider, for instance, the following example by Perner (who, by the 
way, thinks children acquire an initial sense of false belief no earlier than by 
the age of 3). Referring to an earlier study (Clement and Perner 1994) he 
writes:  
 
Wendy Clements tested children on the traditional, unexpected transfer test of 
false belief understanding: Sam the Mouse puts his cheese in one of two boxes 
which are placed in front of the two mouse holes at the extreme top corners of the 
display. While Sam is inside his sleeping quarters invisible to the child, the cheese 
is transferred to the other box. When Sam wakes up and wants his cheese, 
children are asked where he will look for it. Children’s responses show the 
traditional developmental picture (…). Almost all three year olds (2 years 11 
months to 3 years 2 months) answer with the second box (actual location of the 
cheese) while most four year olds get it right, answering with the empty box (where 
Sam believes the cheese is). What is new is that Clements recorded where children 
looked when Sam’s desire for cheese was mentioned. A surprising 80% of the three 
year olds looked at the empty box. Importantly, only a few of the very young 
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children looked there in a control condition in which the only difference was that 
Sam knew where the cheese was because he saw the cheese being moved before he 
went to bed. (Perner 1996: 98). 
 
At this point it is important to note that from a thoroughgoing 
enactivist point of view, there is no paradox. What the child learns in the 
course of its psychological development, according to enactivism, are 
primarily ways of interacting with the world, including other people. From 
that perspective, what the child is able to do when it passes a nonverbal false 
belief test is radically different from what it can do when it passes a verbal 
false belief test. In order to pass a nonverbal false belief tests the child has to 
display spontaneous responses driven by the kinds of sensori-motor process 
that tracks the intentional attitudes of others (Herschbach 2008b: 44). Such 
responses are likely to subserve social interactions in real life such as 
complex forms of what Gallagher (2004b) and Hobson (2002) call secondary 
intersubjectivity, involving joint attention and joint intentionality (think e.g. 
of how this looking behavior may elicit responses from others through gaze-
tracking). What children must be able to do in order to pass the verbal false 
belief test, by contrast, is something quite different. They have to be able to 
participate in a small conversation about an observed scenario in which they 
allow a second person to gain accurate knowledge of the future behavior of 
one of the protagonists in that scenario. Put in these terms, the abilities 
required for passing both tests are so different that no paradox arises from 
the fact that at some stage children can pass one test but not the other.  
 The paradox does arise, however, when we turn to cognitive 
explanations behind these abilities. Being able to enlighten others about the 
future behavior of a third party in a small conversation and being able to 
exhibit certain looking responses are both claimed to be explained in terms 
of knowledge of another person’s false belief. Without further qualification 
of what such knowledge consists in, then, a puzzle emerges. If passing both 
tests requires the same kind of knowledge, then why is it that three year-olds 
pass one but not the other?  
 The solution here is to differentiate between degrees or levels of false 
belief understanding or even between different systems of false belief 
understanding. The very young child’s understanding of false belief may be 
similar but nevertheless distinct from the 4 year old’s understanding. Perner 
and Ruffman (2005), for instance, think that Onishi and Baillargeon’s 15 
month-olds do not really need a ToM to pass the test:  
 
[W]e acknowledge their suggestion that infants expect the observed person to act 
in a particular way. However, we propose that this can be based on behavior rules. 
Infants may have noticed (or are innately predisposed to assume) that people look 
for an object where they last saw it and not necessarily where the object actually is. 
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Again, such a rule captures something implicit about the mind, because the rule 
only applies as a result of the mind mediating between seeing and acting. 
Nonetheless, infants can simply know the rule without any conception that the 
mind is the mediator. (Perner and Ruffman 2005: 215) 
 
The idea, then, is that instead of a ToM, the young child uses a “theory of 
behavior” (ToB) to pass the nonverbal false belief test. Such a ToB may 
consist in behavioral rules, but it may also consist of person-object-place 
associations leading to simple predictions of behavior. The same sorts of 
claims have been made about the social cognitive skills of chimps (Povinelli 
2001, Povinelli and Vonk 2004).  
 Trading ToMs for ToBs strikes many as being too behaviorist, 
however (Csibra and Southgate 2006; see e.g. Tomasello et. al. 2005 for a 
parallel view regarding chimps). But this leaves us with the paradox. Apperly 
and Butterfill (2009), however, explicitly aim to solve the paradox by arguing 
for the idea that we are endowed with two separate ToM systems. Drawing a 
parallel with number cognition, they contend that we have one system for 
computationally efficient but inflexible mindreading and another system for 
flexible but cognitively demanding mindreading. The idea, then, is that 
passing a nonverbal false belief test requires a minimal theory of mind 
(MToM; see also Butterfill and Apperly, forthcoming), while it is likely that 
engaging in conversation about the future behavior of others requires the 
flexible full-blown version of ToM. Thus, introducing a MToM besides a 
regular ToM solves the paradox: 3 year olds have the former but not the 
latter. In a similar fashion other theorists speak of a “naïve theory of mind” 
(e.g. Bogdan 2009) or “early mindreading skills” (Nichols and Stich 2003). 
 It is impossible, without going beyond the scope of this paper, to go 
into the details of the various experiments and the ToM, ToB or MToM 
that are being proposed as explanations for their outcomes. But enough has 
been said to explain the idea that the debate between ToM, ToB, MToM 
and other interpretations of the cognitive mechanisms at play in passing 
nonverbal false belief tests is a debate over the best reconstruction or model 
of these mechanisms. Four features of debate are important: 
 First, in order to draw conclusions about ToM, ToB, or MToM 
capacities from nonverbal false belief tasks the behavioral responses of 
infants are not simply taken at face value. In experiments based on the 
violation of expectation paradigm, the primary explanandum is expectation. 
In experiments based on the predictive looking paradigm, the primary 
explanandum is prediction. Thus, the infants’ looking responses are only 
explained indirectly. The point here is not that interpretations of the 
infants’ looking responses in terms of violation of expectation or prediction 
are far fetched. They aren’t. The point is that the looking responses are 
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interpreted in terms that go beyond the direct, immediate, unreflective 
responses they are to the infants themselves. Remember that Astington 
observes, in the quote in the previous section, that “parents treat infants’ 
spontaneous gestures as intentional communications,” which signals the 
start of a process in which children are scaffolded into our mentalistic 
language game. Here something similar is the case. Scientists give a “thicker” 
reading of the infants’ responses than children themselves are able to give.  
Secondly, the ideas of a ToB or a MToM are somewhat ad hoc. 
Again, this is not intended as a negative qualification. It is merely intended 
to point to the fact that the idea of such “proto-ToMs” did not develop as a 
theoretical consequence of the ToM-ist conception of social cognition as 
such. It developed in response to experimental results that were unexpected, 
at least from the reigning point of view that ToM abilities are acquired by 
the age of 4. As a result, both ToB and MToM are tailor-made to fit the 
results of nonverbal false belief tests (see especially Perner and Ruffman 
2005, and Butterfill and Apperly, forthcoming). 
Thirdly, so far the choice between ToB and MToM (or some other 
option) is underdetermined by the data from nonverbal false belief tests. Of 
course such tests are being improved precisely to limit the number of 
possible interpretations of their outcomes. Thus, for instance, Southgate et. 
al.’s (2007) experimental set-up is an improvement of Onishi and 
Baillargeon’s original experiment, designed specifically to rule out 
interpretations of the infant’s response in terms of ignorance or priming by 
the verbal instructions of the experimenter. Still, the set-up does not rule 
out in principle an interpretation of the infant’s looking response in terms 
of sensitivity to person-object-place associations acquired in familiarization 
trials. Neither does it rule out an interpretation in terms of behaviour-based 
rules.  
The question is whether this underdetermination of the theory of 
infant social cognition by the data is a sign of underdeveloped experimental 
design or whether it is principled. There are good reasons to assume the 
latter. The crucial difference between ToM/MToM and ToB is that the 
former does and the latter does not invoke mental mediation between 
seeing and acting (in the character in the false belief scenario). As Perner 
and Ruffman indicate in the above quote, the idea of ToB instead of ToM 
does not question mental mediation as such. The idea is that the relations 
between seeing and acting relevant for behavior prediction are tractable for 
the infant without invoking mental mediation. The issue between ToB and 
ToM/MToM is when mental mediation is likely to be invoked in order to 
keep the relations between seeing and acting tractable enough to yield 
correct behavioral predictions. Thus, it is implicitly agreed that both ToB 
and ToM explain the data. The question is which is more likely or 
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“realistic”. It may be the case that further experiments may help to tip the 
balance of likelihood or explanatory usefulness in one direction or the other 
(see Butterfill and Apperly, forthcoming for suggestions). But the evidence 
will never be such as to rule out one option in principle. 
Fourthly, it is important to be clear about the explanatory “level” at 
which the debate takes place. Although data about neural activity play a 
significant role in the debate (e.g. in Perner and Ruffman 2005 and Apperly 
and Butterfill 2009), these are not data that point to the implementation of 
a specific cognitive architecture without—usually well argued-for—
interpretation in terms of ToB, ToM or MToM. The bulk of the debate is 
really about inferences to the best explanation of behavioral data. Here 
“explanation” refers to cognitive design, to hypothesized principles of 
information processing. And “best” is a pragmatic and instrumental notion 
the measure of which appears to be a balance between computational 
parsimony and fit with a description of children as natural “mentalizers”. 
Each of these four features of the debate on nonverbal false belief 
tests suggests in its own way that theorizing about infant social cognition in 
terms of ToM, MToM or ToB is basically reconstructive modeling. When 
these features are taken together, this suggestion is nigh impossible to resist. 
The three “theories” do not really function, in the debate, as detailed 
hypotheses about the actual neural circuitry underlying social cognition. 
Rather, they function as abstract descriptions of cognitive design. In other 
words, the debate is not over the truth but over the explanatory and 
predictive usefulness of the three options. This is entirely in line with the 
model-model of ToM. The issue is not whether the infant’s expectation of 
future behavior as manifested in looking behavior is being caused by either 
belief- or behavioral rule understanding, rather the issue is whether it is best 
analyzed in such terms.  
Thus, the idea is that ToB, MToM and ToM can best be viewed as 
models that derive their claim to reality not from correspondence with 
isomorphic brain processes or the conscious experiences of children in test 
situations, but from explanatory and predictive usefulness. To be sure: the 
same would hold for a possible enactivist interpretation of the results of 
implicit false belief tests.8  Such an interpretation would have to prove itself 
as having equal explanatory potential while being more parsimonious than 
ToM, ToB or MToM interpretations (see section 1). Obviously there is no 
room to argue this point on behalf of enactivism here. The purpose of this                                                         
8 No worked-out enactivist account of these experiments has been proposed as far as I 
know. I believe that Butterfill and Apperly’s (forthcoming) account of MToM in many 
respects comes close—with a few modifications—to being an enactive account (see de Bruin, 
Strijbos and Slors, forthcoming). 
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section is merely to emphasize the model-status of ToM or ToM-like 
interpretations of implicit false belief tasks, so that the 
phenomenologist/enactivist claim that ToM is not ubiquitous at the 
phenomenological and/or neural level is shown to be compatible—despite 
initial appearances to the contrary—with recent developments in 
mindreading research. 
Viewing ToM, ToB, and MToM as models is not in any way 
intended to undermine the status of developmental psychology. It is merely 
to make a claim about the nature of explanations in developmental 
psychology. There is nothing scientifically suspect about model explanations 
(think e.g. of models used to predict the weather or economical or 
demographic models). Better models with more predictive or explanatory 
leverage signal an increase in knowledge. The point of arguing for the idea 
that ToM functions as a model in developmental psychology is to emphasize 
that the enactivist/phenomenological rejection of the ubiquity of ToM is 
not contradicted by current developmental psychological research and 
theorizing. And again, like in the previous section, it allows us to explain the 
intuition that ToM is ubiquitous without granting that it is. The alleged 
ubiquity of ToM is derived from the ubiquity of the social cognitive 
processes that can be modeled in terms of ToM. Again, the ubiquity 
assumption is the product of mistaking the model for the real thing. 
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